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Abstract
Certain aspects of advertising–especially on television–are not easily explained with
conventional economic models. In particular, much of the imagery and repetitive the-
matic content seen in advertisements seem “psychological” in nature, as opposed to
“informative.” To understand the economic rationale for this phenomenon, we develop
a theory of endogenous preferences in which information about threshold payoffs (which
we interpret as being present over the course of human evolutionary history) induces
sudden shifts in demand. We show that the resulting demand functions give firms
incentive to provide threshold-related information. To examine the use of threshold-
related content in practice, we study a sample of 370 television advertisements. We
find occurrences of threshold-related content in 83% of food and beverage advertise-
ments for children and in 71% of advertisements for general audiences. Furthermore,
the threshold-related content in children’s food and beverage advertisements occurred
with statistically greater frequency than factual content, which was not true for food
and beverage advertisements aimed at general audiences.
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1 Introduction
Advertising plays a critical role in a market economy. By conveying information about price,
quality, and the existence of new products, advertisements facilitate exchange, expand sales,
and enhance competition. A rich theoretical literature has developed in economics that
sheds light on the conditions under which firms will advertise, the types of products they
advertise, the types of information advertisements convey, and the means through which
advertisements reach consumers.
Many advertisements, especially those on television, contain images and thematic con-
tent that is generally understood as uninformative in conventional economic models. Social
psychologists and marketing professionals, however, have devoted a great deal of energy
(and considerable sums of money) to the task of understanding the hidden motives of the
consumer, and the subtle–and evidently information-free–ways in which advertisements can
influence consumer behavior.
Our objective is to propose an economic rationale for the use of advertising content that
is more “psychological” in nature. We are especially interested in the way in which such
content can lead to shifts in product demand, as well as the payoff structure available to
producers. We draw upon the theory proposed in Smith and Tasnádi (2007, 2009) and
develop a model in which seemingly psychological aspects of television advertisements can
be viewed as informative signals about potential opportunities that are designed to induce
non-convexities in consumer preferences. These non-convexities in preferences correspond in
shifts in demand. Producers respond to this behavior by sending messages, in the form of
advertisements, in an attempt to capture as much of the market as possible. The theory
also generates ex ante predictions about ad content that we use to interpret the content we
observe in a sample of television advertisements.
2 Background
The social function of advertising is undoubtedly the provision of information
concerning the prices and qualities of goods and services available in the markets
(Kaldor, 1950).
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Economic theories of advertising have for the most part aligned with Kaldor’s (1950)
classic summary. Profit maximizing firms, however, are not concerned about how product
information enhances social welfare. Their end goal is to increase profits, and advertising can
act as a means to generate potential transactions. Therefore, from a producer’s perspective,
information provision in advertisements is a means to an end, the end being increased demand
for the product.
Though much of the economic analysis of advertising has abstracted from questions of
information,1 work by Nelson (1970, 1974), and Milgrom and Roberts (1986), demonstrates
the way in which advertisements inform buyers about product characteristics and/or signal
product quality. Moreover, Anderson and Renault (2006) demonstrate how a producer can
strategically provide information about product characteristics, and/or, price and still affect
consumer demand. In each of these articles, advertisements result in demand shifts as
preferences remain unchanged.
In addition to demand shifts, Dorfman and Steiner (1954) suggest that advertisements
can also change the shape, or position, of demand. As a very clever extension to Dorfman
and Steiner (1954), Johnson and Myatt (2006) demonstrate theoretically that information
related to product characteristics, features, and price–hype–all shift market demand, while in-
formation about product style and appeal–real information–rotates market demand.2 These
types of rational agent models emphasize that agents respond to advertisements that contain
product information directly related to product characteristics, price, and quality, or simply
because the advertisement exists (product recognition, repetition). A significant amount
of the content in advertisements, especially those on television, however, is more thematic
in nature.3 There are theoretical and empirical motivations for arguing that thematic-type
content can also affect demand.
1Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993) suggest that advertisements and the respective
product are complements, so increases in the level of advertising can increase demand for the product. Dixit
and Norman (1978) also propose a model where advertising shifts demand, though they argue that it is
through a change in tastes. This is in contrast to the theory of stable preferences in Stigler and Becker
(1977).
2Meyerhoefer and Zuvekas (2008) find that direct-to-consumer advertising of pharmaceuticals both shifts
and rotates demand.
3Although Kaldor (1950) envisioned the function of advertising as providing information in the market
place, he recognized that in practice, advertisements deviated from this view.
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To begin with, Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010), show how a biased expert can make
use of “cheap talk”, i.e., unverifiable messages, to influence a decision maker.4 Furthermore,
Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Schleifer (2008) model how advertisers use what may be
considered uninformative content to create associations that can affect consumer behavior.5
In the realm of social psychology and marketing, Heath, Nairn, and Bottomley (2009)
report evidence that advertisements with more emotional content had a greater effect on
product perception when compared to responses to advertisements with more informational
content. There is also evidence that music (Gorn, 1982; Keflaris and Cox, 1989) and environ-
ment (Dijksterhuis et al., 2005) influence consumer behavior. Both music and environment
send very distinct contextual cues. Recently, Patrick Edson, the MillerCoors VP of mar-
keting and innovation said, “Great organizations get to focus on a real rich area, which is
our ability to decipher consumers’ unarticulated needs and unconscious behaviors” (Ad Age,
2009, emphasis added).6 There is plenty of evidence that social psychologists and marketing
experts recognize the efficacy of situational content in advertising.
Exactly how these situational-type messages work is not completely understood, but
it is important to note that various studies have provided evidence that content can affect
consumers in ways that escape the notice of consumers. For example, Langmaid and Gordon
(1988) report that hypnotized subjects were able to recall almost every detail of previously
viewed television advertisements. This was in contrast to non-hypnotized subjects who did
not recall the advertisements very well at all. Furthermore, Schacter (1996) found that people
tend to prefer products in ads they just saw, even when they do not remember having seen
the advertisement. Gazzaniga (2000) reports on the results from multiple studies of subjects
whose left and right brain hemispheres were surgically separated. In one of the studies,
for example, subjects were shown pictures while covering the left eye. The subjects then
responded to commands as if they had seen the picture, without recalling actually seeing the
4This work is related to the Crawford and Sobel (1982) model of information transmission.
5In their model, they assume that certain agents (“coarse thinkers”) store information in categories where
two items in the same category are linked by some association, or analogy. Advertisers (“persuaders”) can
improve the perception of one item in a category by providing positive information about another item in the
same category. Alternatively, advertisers can create new analogies the agent had not previously developed.
6This statement was part of a seminar given at the 2009 Association of National Advertisers Branding
Conference. Edson’s statement followed 14 consecutive quarters of sales growth for MillerCoors.
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picture.7 Thus, there is recurring evidence in the literature that suggests advertising content
has the potential to affect consumer behavior in ways unnoticed by the consumer.8
In a recent study, economists Bertrand, Karlan, Mullainathan, and Zinman together
with psychologist Shafir (Bertrand et al., 2010) report the results of a field study where
they varied the creative content of a mail flyer that advertised consumer loans. They report
that surprisingly minor changes to the printed mailer had large effects on response rates.
Despite this result, they wrote, “We found it difficult to predict ex ante which types and
variations of creative content would affect demand. This fits with a central premise of
psychology–context matters–and suggests that pinning down the effects that will matter in
various market contexts might require systematic field experimentation on a broad scale” (p.
302). We would add that a more powerful predictive theory is needed to complement this
ambitious goal. The objective here is to develop a theory that will represent a step in this
direction.
We build on the work of Johnson and Myatt (2006) by classifying what type of content
affects demand. We examine, however, the issue of content outside the realm of hype and
real information, i.e., content that is thematic in nature. Our approach is to formulate a
simple problem–achieving a threshold level of some “quality”-that approximates a broad class
of adaptive problems faced by the human species over the course of evolutionary history.
Since the effects of uninformative content are more psychological (and, it is becoming
increasingly apparent, biological) in nature, it seems natural to consider the evolutionary
origins of consumer behavior.9 In the pre-industrial era, humans necessarily learned to re-
spond to states of nature, e.g., environmental, social, familial, and other cues, to maintain
health, survive, and successfully reproduce. Even though situations and responses to situa-
tional cues can change over time (see Konner, 2002), the underlying motivations to maintain
7See Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) and Heath (2001) for interesting details regarding mental
processing of received messages.
8Sutherland (2008) points out that advertising affects behavior in subtle ways, and that the mystical
concept of “subliminal” advertising is merely a myth.
9Responses of this nature may seem more instinctive than psychological. The biological mechanisms
through which responses to various cues develop, however, are the root of human psychology and not at
all separate from it. According to Konner (2002), “The body displays ancient signals and concomitants of
emotion; yet these reactions are not the emotion itself and they do not account for the control of fear and
flight, which must be sought in the brain.”
5
good health, survive, and reproduce have been an integral part of human evolutionary his-
tory.
Consistent with human evolutionary history, the consumer in our model responds to cues
about the threshold levels of quality that correspond directly to states of nature. This behav-
ior provides the incentive for advertisers to send signals with the expectation of influencing a
consumer’s beliefs about threshold levels. Specifically, we think of the advertiser as sending
messages about potential opportunities, that is, achieving a threshold level of quality when
success is uncertain. The opportunities to which we refer are transitions from one state of
nature to another, i.e., transitioning from a low probability, high threshold state to a state
where product consumption is associated with obtaining the threshold. The message about
the high threshold state is that favorable outcomes–health, survival, finding a mate–are never
certain, so one should “watch out” for the negative effects of not achieving the threshold.
We begin with a theoretical context that follows Smith and Tasnádi (2007) where an
agent has preferences for product quality and prefers to consume at least k units of that
quality. They assume that the amount of quality in the choice of consumption goods is
unknown, but the distribution of quality is known and equivalent for the goods. As a result,
when the chance of achieving the threshold level of quality is high, consumers will choose
a combination of goods, i.e., behave in a risk-averse manner. On the other hand, when the
chance of achieving the threshold is low, consumers will specialize in consumption of one
of the goods, i.e., behave in a risk-taking manner. This translates into demands which are
discontinuous in k. We refer to behavior of this sort as situationally dependent; the consumer
will change consumption decisions based on the available information about the threshold k.
We then examine the behavioral implications of this preference structure in a competitive
market framework. Under certain conditions, we show that competing duopolists have an
incentive to expend resources in an effort to influence the consumer’s perception about
the threshold k and obtain a greater share of the market. Our theory not only provides
an explanation for the repeated use of situational-type content, but it also provides ex ante
predictions about the type of content an advertiser would select. A discussion of results from
a content analysis of television advertisements follows. Finally, we conclude with suggestions
for future research.
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3 Advertising and Endogenous Preferences
In economic theory, it is standard practice to assume stable preferences over consumption
goods. We propose a model where preferences are are defined with respect to latent qualities
or outcomes, so that preferences for goods are sensitive to information regarding the threshold
level of quality. Preferences of this nature will allow us to demonstrate how information about
threshold can affect product choice.
3.1 Utility in the Presence of a Quality Threshold
The household production model is one useful method for analyzing preferences for quali-
ties.10 A consumer uses goods purchased in the marketplace, along with time, human capital,
and other training to produce non-market goods, i.e., desired qualities. The production func-
tion for these home produced goods may exhibit decreasing, constant, or increasing returns
to scale.
In the general case, assume that a consumer has preferences defined over a set of non-
market goods, Z1, ..., Zn, which represent qualities the consumer desires to consume, e.g.,
flavor, nutrition, and style. The consumer takes the market prices as given and purchases
market goods, x1, ..., xm, and uses these to produce non-market goods via household produc-
tion technologies Zj = hj(x1, ..., xm). The household production techonolgies may include
human capital, time, and other training. For simplicity, we assume the Zjs are linear func-
tions of the xis, and that human captial, time, and other training are fixed and homogenous
across consumers.
We assume that there are two market goods, x and y, and one quality, Z. The consumer’s
decision problem is to maximize utility subject to his resource constraint and the household
production constraint, i.e.,
maxU(Z) s.t. m = pxx+ pyy,
Z = αxx+ αyy,
where αx and αy represent the technology used to transform the qualities in x and y to the
10See Lancaster (1966) and Stigler and Becker (1977). The Stigler and Becker (1977) article includes a
section on advertising.
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desired quality Z.
One of the assumptions of the household production model is that the quality of the
market goods is known. When the consumer produces quality Z with goods x and y, the
consumer knows exactly the amount of Z he will consume. We relax this assumption and
study the situation where quality of the market goods is unknown, but the distribution of
quality in each of the goods is known. Both x and y are fixed amounts but we will let αx
and αy be random variables which characterize the distribution of quality in their respective
market goods. Since the level of a particular quality in both goods is unknown, Z is also
a random variable. Furthermore, the utility function U(Z) is now itself a random variable,
and we assume that U(Z) has the expected utility form so that the expected value of U(z)
can be written as ∫ ∞
0
U(z)f(z)dz, (1)
where z is the outcome of Z and f(z) is the probability density function of Z.
We impose one final restriction and assume that the combination of x and y must achieve a
threshold level k or utility is 0. Specifically, we can think of utility as 0 when the combination
of x and y yields a quality level below k, and utility equals 1 when the combination of x and
y yields a quality level greater than k. As a result, the expected utility form simplifies to∫ ∞
k
f(z)dz (2)
which characterizes both the expected utility, and probability, of achieving the threshold
level k. The decision problem can be restated as the consumer maximizing the probability
of achieving a threshold level k. In the context of human evolutionary history, we will refer
to the threshold level as good health, survival, and finding a mate.
Tasnádi, Smith, and Hanks (2010)11 focus on this simplified version of the household
production model and show that if consumers choose goods so as to maximize the probabil-
ity of achieving some threshold level of quality, new information about the threshold level
(provided, perhaps, by an advertisement) can induce non-convex preferences over goods and
sudden shifts in demand. In what follows, we briefly discuss a modified version of their
11The model in Tasnádi, Smith, and Hanks (2010) is very similar to that in Smith and Tasnádi (2009),
and both models are a more specific version of Smith and Tasnádi (2007).
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consumer decision problem. Then, we apply the consumer’s decision problem to a duopoly
game in which firms compete by choosing price and advertising levels.
As mentioned previously, a consumer is faced with a menu of two goods, x and y, and
must choose how much of each to consume, given incomem and prices px and py, respectively.
There is a single unobservable characteristic (“quality”) for which there is a critical threshold:
the consumer seeks only to maximize the probability that he consumes k units of this quality.
The amounts of the unobservable quality per unit of x and y are independent random
variables, denoted αx and αy, with distribution functions F and G, respectively. Formally,
the consumer’s utility function is given by
V (x, y) =
∫ ∞
k
f(z)dz = P (αxx+ αyy ≥ k) , (3)
and his decision problem can be stated:
max
x,y
V (x, y),
s.t. pxx+ pyy ≤ m, (4)
x, y ≥ 0.
We assume that the random variables αx and αy are distributed according to the uniform
distribution on the interval [0, 1]. Then the utility function (3) is given by
V (x, y) =
∫ ∞
k
∫ min{x,t}
max{0,t−y}
1
xy
f
(z
x
)
g
(
t− z
y
)
dzdt (5)
which requires integration across five distinct regions in commodity space, which we illustrate
in Figure 1.12
Following Smith and Tasnádi (2007, 2009), we will refer to these regions as follows: the
“death zone”
A0 =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+ | x+ y ≤ k
}
in which the probability of meeting the threshold is zero, the low-probability region
A−− =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+ | k < x+ y, x ≤ k, y ≤ k
}
12See Smith and Tasnádi (2007) for a complete proof.
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A0
A−−
A−+ A++
A+−
x
y
Figure 1: Five Regions
in which the probability of meeting the threshold is positive but the consumption levels of
both goods are small (i.e., x, y ≤ k), the region
A−+ =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+ | x ≤ k, k < y
}
in which the consumption level of x is small, the region
A+− =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+ | k < x, y ≤ k
}
in which the consumption level of y is small, and the region
A++ =
{
(x, y) ∈ R2+ | k < x, k < y
}
in which the consumption levels of both x and y are large relative to the size of the threshold.
Integration of (5) yields
U(x, y) =


0 if 0 ≤ x+ y ≤ k,
1− k
x
+ y
2x
+ (k−x)
2
2xy
if x+ y > k, x ≤ k and y ≤ k,
1 + x
2y
− k
y
if x+ y > k, x ≤ k and y > k,
1 + y
2x
− k
x
if x+ y > k, x > k and y ≤ k,
1− k
2
2xy
if x+ y > k, x > k and y > k.
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Note that utility is zero in region A0, strictly convex in region A−−, linear in A+− and A−+,
and strictly concave in region A++, as shown in Figure 2 (Smith and Tasnádi, 2007, 2009).
Based on the above utility function, we derived the correspondences for x and y that
solve the decision problem in equation (4). Specifically, (x∗, y∗) ∈

{(
m
2px
, m
2py
)}
if m
2px
> k and px ≥ py;{(
0, m
py
)}
if m
2px
< k and px > py;{
λ
(
m
2px
, m
2py
)
+ (1− λ)
(
0, m
py
)
, λ ∈ [0, 1]
}
if m
2px
= k and px > py;{(
m
2px
, m
2py
)}
if m
2py
> k and px < py;{(
m
px
, 0
)}
if m
2py
< k and px < py;{
λ
(
m
2px
, m
2py
)
+ (1− λ)
(
m
px
, 0
)
, λ ∈ [0, 1]
}
if m
2py
= k and px < py;{(
0, m
py
)
,
(
m
px
, 0
)}
if m
2px
< k and px = py;{(
m
py
− λ, λ
)
, λ ∈ [0, m
px
]
}
if m
2px
= k and px = py.
if positive utility levels are attainable (m
px
> k or m
py
> k).13 These demands are set-valued
in four cases. For simplicity, we resolve this indeterminacy by assuming that the consumer
spends his money equally between the two products whenever possible. However, this is
not possible if m
2px
< k and px = py. In this case, we assume that the consumer randomizes
between the two corner solutions by choosing either with probability 1/2.14 A key result from
the consumer’s decision problem is that demand is discontinuous in the threshold parameter
k. In Figure 3 we show how the presence of a high threshold leads the consumer to specialize
in consumption of one good. This behavior is an attempt to shift as much probability mass
as possible to the event of obtaining the favorable outcome.
The indifference curves in x, y-space demonstrate concave preferences below the threshold
and convex preferences above the threshold. Quality of x and y is not observed until they
are consumed, thus the consumer must allocate resources in such a way that the probability
of achieving the threshold is maximized. When the threshold is high, the consumer will
specialize in one good and when the threshold is low, he will consume a combination of the
13See Smith and Tasnádi (2007, 2009); Tasnádi, Smith, and Hanks (2010).
14Resolving indeterminacy in this way guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies in
Proposition 1. Otherwise, there would exist many ε-equilibria in pure strategies close to the solution given
in Proposition 1.
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goods, since this will yield a higher probability of achieving the threshold. This behavior can
be understood as risk-taking when the threshold is high and risk-averse when the threshold
is low. As mentioned above, the risk-taking strategy is optimal when k is high because the
consumer wishes to shift as much probability mass as possible to the favorable outcome.
k
k
x
y
Figure 2: Indifference Curves (k = 1)
3.2 Thresholds
Our theory emphasizes a binary outcome (satisfaction of a threshold) both because it is
an analytically tractable assumption, and because it represents a broad class of adaptive
problems likely to have been important in human evolutionary history. Most generally,
evolutionary biologists typically sort evolutionary forces between those acting via natural
selection (e.g., survival), and those acting via sexual selection (e.g., reproduction).15 Sur-
vival (i.e., live or die) and reproduction (i.e., find a mate or don’t; produce an offspring or
not) are the starkest of binary outcomes, and they still affect our behavior today, in ways
big and small. Of course, outcomes are never certain, and perfect information about impor-
tant life events has never been readily available, so the behavioral implications of underlying
15In their book How Humans Evolved, Boyd and Silk (2009) explain, “...we have focused on reproductive
behavior because mating and parenting strongly affect fitness.”
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m
2py
m
2px
m
px
m
2py
x∗(k)
y∗(k)
m
px
k
x∗, y∗
Figure 3: Optimal solutions for x and y as functions of k
threshold payoffs will necessarily be dominated by responsiveness to available information.
It is also important to recognize that the preference structure presented above directly
relates to situation-dependent utility. In other words, the consumption decision is affected
by the current level of k. This is similar to the work by Caplin and Leahy (2004) where a
“concerned expert” determines whether it is optimal to fully reveal the true state of the world
to a recipient whose utility is affected by evolving beliefs about the current state of the world,
as well as observed outcomes.16 Such models of belief dependent utility provide important
insights for understanding why context matters in advertisements. In what follows, we will
show how firms make use of the belief dependent utility by providing information about the
threshold level of quality.
3.3 Simple duopoly game
Here, we develop a model with competing duopolists and show that the presence of the
threshold affects pricing and advertising decisions. In the market there are two competing
duopolists, firms x and y, that set prices px and py, respectively. Moreover, the firms can
16Utility of this nature is directly related to utility in psychological games. These games were first studied
by Geanakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1989).
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manipulate the consumer’s threshold level with advertisement levels δx and δy, respectively.
The firms have linear cost functions with respective positive unit costs cx and cy. The
demand functions Dx and Dy of the two firms are derived from the utility maximization
problem of the representative consumer described in the previous section. The firms’ profit
functions equal
Πi(px, py, δx, δy) = Di(px, py, k + δx + δy)(pi − ci)− aδ
2
i ,
where a is a positive parameter for advertisment costs, and i = x, y. In what follows we will
assume that cx < cy.
The duopolists interact in a three stage game where in the first stage, the low-cost
firm chooses its advertising strategy, δx. In the second stage, the high-cost firm reacts by
choosing δy, and finally the firms set their prices simultaneously. To simplify the analysis,
we assume that firm y stays out of the market if it cannot make positive profit. This
simplification implies a modification of our results from Tasnádi, Smith, and Hanks (2010),
which determine the Nash equilibrium of the final subgame. Hence, we obtain the following
results for the final subgame.
Proposition 1 If m
2cy
> k, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which both firms
set price p∗ = m
2k
.
When we enter a different region of the commodity space, the pricing decision for the firms
changes. Proposition 2 demonstrates this change.
Proposition 2 If m
cx
≥ k ≥ m
2cy
, then firm x will drive firm y out of the market by setting
price cy.
Finally, we mention the case in which firms x and y can just sell their products by taking a
loss. In this case the firms can stay out of the market by setting sufficiently high prices.
Proposition 3 If k > m
cx
, then firms x and y stay out of the market by setting prices above
their respective unit costs.
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We will now introduce the situation where the duopolists can advertise. Consider Propo-
sitions 1 and 2. It appears that if m
2cx
> k and m
2cy
> k, then firm x could benefit from
increasing the threshold level to move the consumer into region m
2cx
> k + δ > m
2cy
. Clearly,
firm y has opposite incentives. Recall that demands are discontinuous functions of the
threshold, so the relative magnitude of k will affect firm behavior.17
We solve the advertising and pricing game by backwards induction. If the firms set δx
and δy in the first two stages, then these decisions are sunk costs in the final stage. Thus,
the final subgame reduces to the game covered by Propositions 1, 2 and 3, where k has to be
replaced with k˜ = k+δx+δy. The selected values for δx and δy determine, which proposition
of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 must be applied for the final price-setting stage. For instance, by
Proposition 1, the firms set prices p = px = py =
m
2k˜
if m
2cy
> k˜.
Now we turn to stage 2 in which δx is given. The profit function of firm y equals
18
Πy(δy) =


m
2
− (k + δx + δy)cy − aδ
2
y if
m
2cy
> k + δx + δy > 0,
−aδ2y if
m
2cy
≤ k + δx + δy or k + δx + δy ≤ 0.
(6)
By taking the first-order condition of the first case, we obtain that δ∗y = −
cy
2a
solves the profit
maximization problem of firm y if m
2cy
> k + δx + δ
∗
y > 0 and Πy(δ
∗) > 0. Since the latter
inequality is equivalent to m
2cy
> k + δx −
cy
4a
condition m
2cy
> k + δx + δ
∗
y is less restrictive
than Πy(δ
∗) > 0, and thus, we obtain the following ‘best response function’:19
δ∗y(δx) =


− cy
2a
if m
2cy
> k + δx −
cy
4a
and k + δx −
cy
2a
> 0,
0 if
(
m
2cy
≤ k + δx −
cy
4a
and k + δx −
cy
2a
> 0
)
or(
k + δx −
cy
2a
≤ 0 and m
2
− a(k + δx)
2 ≤ 0
)
,
−k − δx if k + δx −
cy
2a
≤ 0, and m
2
− a(k + δx)
2 > 0.
We have an interior solution in the first case, while for the second case Propositions 2 and
3 apply for the terminal subgame; in particular, firm y stays out of the market. In the
third case, the best reply function for firm y demonstrates that as the threshold decreases
17We focus on the case when k is sufficiently high to allow use of standard optimization techniques. When
k is relatively low, we rely on suprema instead of maxima to study equilibrium conditions.
18Based on the two sentences following equation (6) it can be verified that Πy is nonnegative.
19In some cases a best response does not exist. In these cases, we have considered the appropriate sup
value of the profit function.
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in magnitude, interior solutions no longer obtain and we must rely on suprema instead of
maxima concerning the profits of firm y. The definition of the best reply by
δsupy = −k − δx, (7)
is motivated by the fact that
sup
{
Πy (δy) |
m
2cy
> k + δx + δy > 0
}
= lim
δy→(−k−δx)+
Πy(δy)
if k + δx −
cy
2a
≤ 0.20
Finally, we determine the first-stage action of firm x. Taking the reaction of firm y into
account and assuming that firm x has to enter the market even if it makes losses, firm x’s
profit function is given by
Πx(δx) =


m
2
− (k + δx −
cy
2a
)cx − aδ
2
x if
cy
2a
− k < δx <
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
, (i)
m− m
cy
cx − aδ
2
x if
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
≤ δx and
cy
2a
− k < δx, (ii)
m− m
cy
cx − aδ
2
x if
√
m
2a
− k ≤ δx ≤
cy
2a
− k, (iii)
m
2
− aδ2x if −k ≤ δx <
√
m
2a
− k and δx ≤
cy
2a
− k, (iv)
−aδ2x if δx < −k. (v)
In order to simplify the presentation of our results and to decrease the number of pos-
sible scenarios, we assume that firm x enters the market. We will refer to the regions
corresponding to the above five regions by (i)-(v), respectively. One can check that Πx is
piecewise continuous and differentiable, where the appropriate intervals can be obtained
by looking at the boundaries of the five regions. Observe that region (iii) is empty if
2ma > c2y, while region (i) is empty if 2ma < c
2
y. Hence, we have to check Πx either on the
intervals (−∞,−k),
(
−k, cy
2a
− k
)
,
(
cy
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
)
,
(
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
)
or (−∞,−k),(
−k,
√
m
2a
− k
)
,
(√
m
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
)
,
(
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
)
.
LetΠix(δx) =
m
2
−(k+δx−
cy
2a
)cx−aδ
2
x, Π
ii
x (δx) = Π
iii
x (δx) = m−
m
cy
cx−aδ
2
x, Π
iv
x (δx) =
m
2
−aδ2x
and Πvx(δx) = −aδ
2
x, where all five functions are assumed to be defined over the entire real
line (and not only above the respective intervals one should expect from Πx). The maximum
values for Πix, Π
ii
x and Π
iv
x are achieved at −
cx
2a
, 0 and 0, respectively. It can be verified that
Πix
(
cy
2a
− k
)
= Πivx
(
cy
2a
− k
)
.
20This is equivalent to changing the demand and profit functions at threshold level 0 in order to simplify
our analysis. If under this modified specification an equilibrium with k + δx + δy = 0 arises, the original
game has many ε-Nash equilibria close to the determined solution of the modified game.
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3.3.1 An Interesting Case
In the following proposition, we demonstrate that the low-cost firm will use information
about thresholds in advertisements to drive the high-cost firm out of the market.21
Proposition 4 If cy
2a
− k < − cx
2a
, 0 < m
2cy
+ cy
4a
− k and
Πiix
(
m
2cy
+
cy
4a
− k
)
> Πix
(
−
cx
2a
)
, (8)
then the low-cost firm drives the high-cost firm out of the market by increasing the consumer’s
threshold level via advertisments (δx =
m
2cy
+ cy
4a
− k) and setting price cy.
Proof. It can be checked that by − cx
2a
< m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
we have Πix
(
− cx
2a
)
> 0, and therefore
it follows that maximizing Πx (δx) gives us the required first-stage action of firm x. By our
assumptions and the continuity of Πx at
cy
2a
−k, we only need to maximize Πx over the intervals[
cy
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
]
and
[
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
]
.22 It can be verified that Πix is maximized at
δx = −
cx
2a
within
[
cy
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
]
and Πiix at
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
within
[
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
]
by
our assumptions, which completes the proof by considering Πx (δx), δ
∗
y (δx) and Πy (δy). The
appropriate price is determined by the results in Propositions 1 and 2.23
Proposition 4 demonstrates the situation where the low cost firm’s profits from driving
the high-cost firm out of the market are greater than the profits from choosing a strategy to
share the market with that firm. The profit functions take the form
m−
m
cy
cx − a
(
m
2cy
− k +
cy
2a
)
>
m
2
−
(
k −
cx
2a
−
cy
2a
)
cx − a
( cx
2a
)2
. (9)
When it is profitable, the low-cost firm will advertise to increase the threshold just enough,
and will set a price equal to cy, so that the high cost firm will not enter the market. Thus,
the low-cost firm receives all income m and though production increases, will not pay enough
in costs to justify switching to the market-sharing strategy. Note that for this result to hold,
the income to production cost ratio must be high, especially relative to the threshold.
21As is evident in the analysis of the duopolist’s game, there are various other equilibrium situations that
arise, given certain conditions. The set of full derivations is available from the authors upon request.
22Πv
x
(δx) is negative in region (v).
23A more general proof is available from the authors.
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According to our model of preferences, information that the threshold is high suggests
that the consumer has a low probability of achieving the threshold. Thus, the consumer will
choose the good which will yield the highest chance of obtaining the favorable outcome.
This result fits nicely with our story that messages about the threshold level can influ-
ence demand. If humans still respond to cues that inform them about the current state
of health, survival, and reproduction, it should not be surprising that advertisers incorpo-
rate related content into their ads. Furthermore, use of content related to health, survival,
and reproductive success places the product in the context of these threshold-type situa-
tions. Since realizations of good health, survival, and reproductive success are often binary
in nature–achieved or not–we think of realizing favorable outcomes as achieving a threshold
level of quality. Environmental, situational, or other cues about the state of nature trigger
behavioral responses that have developed over the thousands of years of natural selection
(see Konner, 2002). Firms recognize this behavior and under a proper set of parameters, a
firm will advertise a high-thrshold state. From the firm’s perspective, it is only reasonable
to send positive product messages. Thus, we interpret advertisements as presenting two
distinct states, one in which the threshold is high and the payoff is very uncertain, and one
in which the product is associated with achieving the threshold.24
To cite one stark example, an advertisement which aired in 2002 for the McDonald’s
Mighty Kids Meal (described in Smith, 2004) shows a group of children playing basketball.
One of the children suddenly freezes and his friends carry him inside his house, set him on a
couch, and set a fast food meal directly in front of him. Miraculously, the child jumps back
to full activity as he rapidly consumes the meal. Before product consumption, the child’s
state of nature was serious–the threshold was very high. In this advertisement, the states of
nature represented are: 1) the fact that good health is never certain and 2) consumption of
this particular meal is associated with the favorable outcome of good health. The power of
such an appeal is informed by knowledge of nutritional anthropology: in the pre-industrial
world in which humans evolved, micronutrient deficiencies were not uncommon. A child in
that world witnessing such a scene–in which a specific food item appears to cure a severe
24This is consistent with the theory presented in Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, and Schleifer (2008). The
analogies in our model can be thought of as situations where product consumption is associated with achieving
the threshold.
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illness–would do well to incorporate said food item into his diet, enthusiastically. The high
threshold is suggested through uncertain health and the favorable outcome, associated with
good health, is associated with consumption of the McDonald’s Mighty Kids Meal.
We have reason to expect that advertisers employ different strategies for content use
when targeting different audiences. To be specific, the types of situations children and
adults faced in the pre-industrial era were different then, and still are today. For example,
children develop dietary preferences and tastes for foods by observing dietary habits of
family and friends (Smith, 2004). Also, younger children are not expected to be influenced
by associations between the product and romance. Thus, we expect to see less content related
to courtship in children’s advertisements compared to the frequency of the same content in
advertisements for general audiences.
4 Data and Evidence
In order to study the content in advertisements, we collected a convenience sample of 370
unique nationally broadcast television advertisements.25 A general description of our sample
is provided in Table 1.26 Although the sample is weighted towards children’s programs in
terms of time, there were fewer unique advertisements during these programs.
Table 1: Ad Sample by Target Audience
Children General Audience Total
Unique Advertisements 155 215 370
Programming Hours 25 13 38
To study content in the sample of advertisements, we performed a content analysis based
on a pre-determined list of content categories. We generated an initial category list af-
25We omitted advertisements that were limited to regional audiences because we believe they are less likely
to include sophisticated (and hence effective) marketing techniques. Also, our sample omits movie trailers,
movie advertisements, and video game advertisements since ads for these goods are of a much different nature
than the ads of the other goods in the sample. Specifically, we omitted advertisements which did not include
a potential product user.
26We recorded ads during children’s programming, as well as programs aimed at a more general audience,
on various dates in June and July, 2007.
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ter viewing a set of out-of-sample advertisements, with only minor adjustments thereafter.
Several of the categories relate to direct information such as price, product features, and
verifiable claims about product quality.27
We also defined categories which captured content related to thresholds: health, survival,
and finding a mate, which we will refer to as courtship. For the health threshold, we doc-
umented which advertisements contained content that associated the product with obvious
improvements in health or well-being. As an example, a Coors Light advertisement in our
sample begins with the view of a crowded street in the middle of a sweltering hot day. Traffic
was very slow and people appeared lethargic and unhappy. Suddenly, a train barrels through
an open lane in the street followed by a wake of snow that transforms into cans of Coors
Light. Party-like music fills the streets and an immediate shift in well-being is demonstrated
as the characters joyfully cheer and dance–the opportunity has been signaled. Similar to
the McDonald’s advertisement described above, this ad demonstrates a contrast in states of
the world that depend on product consumption. The threshold payoff is markedly improved
health, which is achieved with product consumption.
Content associated with survival typically demonstrates life-threatening situations when
a character (or implied character) in the advertisement does not consume the product. For
example, two advertisements in our sample for Ford F-150 trucks emphasize the 4-star crash
rating awarded to these trucks. Also, images of the truck smashing into a wall accompany
safety rating declarations. This imagery signals product safety by exposing safety features.
The opportunity presents itself as safe transportation when travel in other vehicles is dan-
gerous. In other words, the threshold is high when not traveling in a Ford F-150.28
Courtship-related content associates romantic relations with product use. For example,
an advertisement for a buy-one-get-one half off sale at Payless Shoes stores shows two attrac-
tive female models wearing Payless shoes as they walk through an outdoor shopping area.
They step onto an escalator and exchange glances with a stylishly dressed male model on an
adjacent escalator heading the opposite direction. The male model jumps over the escalator
rails onto the other escalator and the two ladies look at each other and smile. At this point,
27Refer to the appendix for the specific descriptions we used when coding for content.
28Recall region A0, the “death zone.” When k is high, this region expands over a greater set of feasible
combinations of x and y, which results in a greater probability of not achieving the threshold.
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the narrator says, “Before you know it, it’s gone,” explicitly referring to the current sale. The
male model then exchanges glances with another attractive female wearing Payless shoes,
but headed on the escalator he previously abandoned. He looks ahead at the two he initially
intended to follow and looks back at the other as she heads off the escalator and smiles. The
explicit meaning of this statement is to notify viewers of the limited time offer. The imagery,
however, seems to suggest that valuable romantic opportunities are available to consumers
of Payless Shoes, but that success is far from certain. The narration emphasizes that the
sale is limited and delays can result in missed romantic opportunities.
Table 2 provides a description of the threshold themes and factual content. See the
appendix for more detailed descriptions.
Table 2: Content Descriptions
Content Type Description
Factual Content Declarations of the product’s price; product character-
istics; verifiable quality claims
Health Obvious improvements in health and/or well being
when a character sees or hears about the product.
Survival Negative consequences for those not using the product.
Courtship Obviously romantic relationship between a male and
female character, one of which uses the product.
Tables 3 and 4 report estimated frequencies and confidence intervals for specific types of
content during children’s programs and programs for a general audience. We will first discuss
the results in the final column of each table that show the overall frequencies of specific
content for advertisements targeted at children (Table 3) and advertisements targeted at a
general audience (Table 4).
We report results for general factual content and then divide that content into is separate
components of price, features, and verifiable quality claims. Similarly for threshold relate
themes, we report general use of such themes and then report more specific threshold-related
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categories of health, survival, and courtship.29 The other columns in tables 3 and 4 include
frequencies for content in advertisements for specific product groups.
To begin with, it is interesting to recognize the infrequent use of price in advertisements.
Information about price occurred in 8% of all ads aimed at children and 15% of all ads aimed
at a more general audience (the difference is statistically insignificant). Why advertisers do
not reveal a product’s price more often is not the focus of this paper, though Anderson and
Renault (2006) provide reasons why advertisers may have incentive to not disclose certain
information in an advertisement. There could also be contractual or strategic reasons not to
reveal prices. The theory in Anderson and Renault (2006), however, does not specify which
product information the advertiser will choose to disclose.
Although product price is not frequently included in advertisements, there is a substantial
amount of other factual information. The data reveal that most of this factual information
comes in the form of product features, i.e., observable product characteristics whether ex-
plicitly stated or shown via screen shots. For all product types, product features occur in
75% of all ads targeted at children and almost 70% of all ads targeted at a more general
audience. This result also reveals that 25% of all ads targeted at children and 30% of all ads
targeted a more general audience lacked any information about product features or price.
A very interesting fact in our data is that there are few verifiable quality claims. We
define verifiable quality claims as claims about the product quality that could be falsified
through independent testing. We found that while 3% of all advertisements aimed at children
included verifiable quality claims, they appeared in 20% of all advertisements aimed at a more
general audience. Furthermore, the estimated difference in frequencies of verifiable quality
claims in all advertisements for children and general audiences is significant at the 95%
confidence level. This makes sense because children are probably less concerned than adults
about quality, or are less likely to think about the expected future benefits signaled by a
quality statement.
Tables 3 and 4 also report content frequencies for specific product types. The auto, food
29We calculated frequencies by counting whether a specific type of content occurred in an advertisement.
For the factual content and threshold-related theme general categories, if two of the specific categories were
used, we still report that the general category was triggered, and not how many times it was triggered in an
advertisement.
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Table 3: Content Frequency by Product Type: Children
Products
Food / Household
Content Beverage Products Services Toys All Products
Factual 0.68 0.89 0.52 1** 0.77
[0.56, 0.79] [0.67, 0.99] [0.31, 0.72] [0.93, 1] [0.70, 0.84]
Price 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.11 0.08
[0.00, 0.11] [0.06, 0.46] [0.01, 0.26] [0.04, 0.25] [0.05, 0.14]
Features 0.64 0.89 0.52 1** 0.75
[0.51, 0.75] [0.67, 0.99] [0.31, 0.72] [0.93, 1] [0.68, 0.82]
Verifiable Quality 0.05* 0.05 0.04 0.00** 0.03*
[0.01, 0.13] [0.00, 0.26] [0.00, 0.20] [0.00, 0.066] [0.01, 0.07]
Thresholds 0.83 0.68 0.56 0.66 0.72*
[0.72, 0.91] [0.43, 0.87] [0.35, 0.76] [0.50, 0.80] [0.64, 0.79]
Health 0.79 0.63 0.44 0.61 0.66*
[0.67, 0.88] [0.38, 0.84] [0.24, 0.65] [0.45, 0.76] [0.58, 0.73]
Survival 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.09 0.08
[0.01, 0.13] [0.03, 0.40] [0.03, 0.31] [0.03, 0.22] [0.05, 0.14]
Courtship 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.07*
[0.03, 0.17] [0.03, 0.40] [0.00, 0.20] [0.01, 0.15] [0.04, 0.12]
Sample Size 66 19 25 44 155
The bracketed values represent 95% confidence intervals for the probability estimates, located above the
intervals, in the table. We omitted the auto product category from this table because our sample had only
one ad of this type during children’s programs. The “All Products” column, however, includes the auto
advertisement.
* Statistically different from the estimated frequency of content during programs for general audiences.
** Since the estimated frequency is 1, we cannot estimate if there is a difference between this frequency
and the frequency for content during programs for general audiences.
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and beverage, and toys product categories are the most narrow product categories so they
likely yield the least amount of bias in estimates for the probability of content frequency.30
Thus, we will focus our discussion on these three product categories.
In food and beverage advertisements that occurred during programs for general audiences,
12% of the advertisements conveyed price information whereas 3% of food and beverage
advertisements for children included price information. In the same product group, features
occurred in 64% of ads for children and 66% of ads for general audiences. Once again in the
same product group, verifiable quality claims occurred 27% of the time, whereas 50% of the
food and beverage advertisements during children’s programs had verifiable quality claims.
We found this difference to be statistically significant.
In the automobile product category (general audience), 17% of the advertisements had
price information, 72% had information about product features, and 36% had verifiable qual-
ity claims. In advertisements for toys (children), we found that 11% had price information,
all of them included information about product features, and none of them had verifiable
quality claims.
We also found considerable evidence that advertisers use threshold-related themes. These
themes occurred in 72% of all ads targeted at children and 60% of all ads targeted at adults.
Refer to the health and survival situations in the Coors Light and Ford F-150 advertisements.
In both cases, the situation suggested a high threshold and that product use would ensure the
threshold is achieved. Across all product types, content directly related to health surfaced in
66% of ads targeted at children and 49% of ads targeted at general audiences. This difference
is statistically significant. Survival-related content appeared in only 8% of all children’s ads
and 6% of all ads for general audiences. In the Payless Shoes advertisement, the threshold
for courtship increased as the chance to obtain an attractive mate seemed to slip away. In
our sample, content directly related to a high courtship threshold occurred in 7% of all
ads targeted at children and 16% of all ads targeted at general audiences. This difference
is also statistically significant. It makes sense that advertisers use more thematic content
in advertisements for children since children are probably influenced more by imagery and
30There was only 1 auto advertisement in ads targeted at children and 1 toy advertisement in ads targeted
at a more general audience, thus we omit auto product category from Table 3 and we omit the toy product
category from Table 4.
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Table 4: Content Frequency by Product Type: General Audience
Products
Food / Household
Content Autos Beverage Products Services All Products
Factual 0.75 0.71 0.80 0.68 0.75
[0.58, 0.88] [0.58, 0.82] [0.70, 0.88] [0.51, 0.82] [0.69, 0.81]
Price 0.17 0.12 0.19 0.13 0.15
[0.06, 0.33] [0.05, 0.23] [0.11, 0.29] [0.04, 0.28] [0.11, 0.21]
Features 0.72 0.66 0.68 0.66 0.68
[0.55, 0.86] [0.53, 0.78] [0.57, 0.78] [0.49, 0.80] [0.61, 0.74]
Verifiable Quality 0.36 0.27* 0.17 0.08 0.21*
[0.21, 0.54] [0.16, 0.40] [0.10, 0.27] [0.02, 0.21] [0.16, 0.27]
Thresholds 0.42 0.71 0.59 0.58 0.60*
[0.26, 0.59] [0.58, 0.82] [0.48, 0.70] [0.41, 0.74] [0.53, 0.66]
Health 0.36 0.64 0.50 0.37 0.49*
[0.21, 0.54] [0.51, 0.76] [0.38, 0.61] [0.22, 0.54] [0.42, 0.56]
Survival 0.11 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.06
[0.03, 0.26] [0.0004, 0.09] [0.008, 0.10] [0.03, 0.25] [0.03, 0.10]
Courtship 0.06 0.2 0.17 0.18 0.16*
[0.01, 0.19] [0.11, 0.33] [ 0.10, 0.27] [0.08, 0.34] [0.12, 0.22]
Sample Size 36 59 81 38 215
The bracketed values represent 95% confidence intervals for the probability estimates, located above the
intervals, in the table. We omitted the toys product category from this table because our sample had only
one toy advertisement during programs for a general audience. The “All Products” column, however,
includes toy advertisement.
* Statistically different at the 95% confidence level from the estimated frequency of content during
children’s advertisements.
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situational-type messages.
Similar to the results for all product types, we found repeated use of content related
to high thresholds in advertisements for separate product types. The most prominent use
occurred in food and beverage advertisements. In this product group, the health-related
theme occurred in 79% of advertisements for children compared to 64% of ads which appeared
during programs for general audiences. In the same product group, survival-related content
occurred in 5% of the ads for children and 2% of the ads for a general audience. Once again
in the same product group, 8% of children’s advertisements had courtship-related content
while 20% of ads for a general audience had this type of content.
In advertisements for automobiles and related products (general audience) we found
health-related themes in 36%, survival-related themes in 11%, and courtship-related themes
in 6% of the advertisements. In toy advertisements (children), 61% had a health-related
theme, 9% had a survival-related theme, and 5% had a courtship-related theme.31
In the samples for both target audiences, we found statistically significant evidence that
threshold-related content occurred more frequently in food and beverage advertisements
than for all product types. In children’s advertisements, we also found that factual content
in food and beverage advertisements occurred less frequently than for all product types.
Furthermore, we found that threshold-related content in children’s food and beverage ad-
vertisements occurred with greater probability than in the aggregate, all products group. In
advertisements for general audiences, we found that threshold-related content occurred less
frequently (statistically) in advertisements for automobiles and related products than for all
products. On the other hand, threshold-related content occurred more frequently (statisti-
cally) in food and beverage advertisements for general audiences relative to the probability
of threshold-related content in all ads for general audiences. We suggest that these results
point to a potentially strategic decision by advertisers to use certain types of content in
particular product groups.
Economic theories of advertising predict the usefulness of factual information to increase
31The difference between the probabilities of verifiable quality statements in food and beverage advertise-
ments for children and general audiences is statistically significant. This is the only statistically significant
result for differences in content frequency in product types for children and general audiences. It is probably
due to small sample sizes.
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sales. We also think that threshold-related content has an influence on behavior, and thus,
there is strategic use for it. It would make sense, therefore, to compare the estimated
probabilities of factual content to threshold-related content. We do this by placing the
difference in probabilities for the two types of content on a scale from -1 to 1. A negative
value represents a numerically greater probability of threshold content, and a positive value
represents a numerically greater probability of factual content. The idea is that the farther
apart the probabilities are spaced, the more reason to believe that threshold-related content
is strategically used.
In children’s advertisements, we find that advertisements for food and beverage and ser-
vices groups contain more threshold-related content, but the difference is statistically signifi-
cant at the 10% level of confidence only for the food and beverage category. In advertisements
for a general audience, the scale reveals that advertisements for this target audience contain
greater frequencies of factual content, and the only statistically significant difference is for
the services category. When we compared the two scales, we found that there is a greater
spread in the differences of content type in children’s advertisements. Also, a greater spread
between threshold-related content and factual content in children’s advertisements suggests
a greater use of this content in advertisements for children.
In summary, our sample reveals frequent use of content related to thresholds. Repeated
use of this content suggests that advertisements portray the “opportunity” to obtain a de-
sirable outcome. Furthermore, the advertisements also suggest that obtaining the desirable
outcome is far from certain. Yet, the favorable outcome of obtaining the threshold is asso-
ciated with product consumption.
5 Conclusion
In order to provide economic rationale for the use of thematic-type content in television
advertisements, we propose a model of consumer and producer behavior where information
about threshold payoffs induces sudden shifts in demand. In our model, quality thresholds
in consumer preferences lead to risk averse behavior when the threshold is low and risk-
taking behavior when the threshold is high. We then derive demand functions that are
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discontinuous in the threshold k, so a high k will result in a shift in product demand. Given
these demand functions, and under certain conditions, a low-cost firm has the incentive to
advertise a high threshold and associate a specific product with achieving the threshold.
When these thresholds are placed in the context of human evolutionary history, we are able
to provide a more compelling predictive theory for the use of the psychological content in
advertisements.
The theory we present helps explain the repeated use of certain threshold-related themes
in television advertisements. These themes appear to be designed to convey the message
that there is a low probability of achieving a threshold level of quality in the current state
of nature, but that the opportunity to achieve that threshold is on the horizon. Thus,
advertisers depict a stark contrast between the current, high-threhsold, state of nature and
the potential, with product consumption, favorable state of nature.
Our findings represent only a small step in the direction of understanding the mecha-
nisms through which thematic content can affect consumer behavior. As a result, there are
numerous possibilities for further research. For example, a natural extension of this work
would be to conduct experiments where the effects of certain types of content are measured.
It would also be interesting to conduct an empirical study of firm behavior that tracks use of
specific content in advertisements and corresponding sales data. Unfortunately, data of this
sort can be very difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, the frequent use of specific types of content
in television advertising begs for a more formal economic theory of advertising content.
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Appendix
A General Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 is a simplified result of the more general Proposition 5. We were able to simplify
equation (10) of Proposition 5 by imposing the conditions cy
2a
−k < − cx
2a
, and 0 < m
2cy
+ cy
4a
−k.
The steps are below.
In reference to equation (10), the assumption that cy
2a
− k < − cx
2a
eliminates cy
2a
− k as a
possibility for an optimal choice for δx. The two conditions also make it so that Π
iv
x is not a
feasible strategy so this eliminates the potential Nash Equilibrium strategy of Πivx . Finally,
when the two conditions hold, Πix
(
− cx
2a
)
> Πy
(
cy
2a
)
> 0, from the analysis of the three-stage
game. Therefore, equation (10) simplifies to equation (8) in Proposition 4.
Now, the proof for the more general result of Proposition 5 is below.
Proposition 5 If 2ma ≥ c2y,
cy
2a
− k ≤ 0 ≤ m
2cy
+ cy
4a
− k and
Πiix
(
m
2cy
+
cy
4a
− k
)
> max
{
Πix
(
max
{
−
cx
2a
,
cy
2a
− k
})
,Πivx
( cy
2a
− k
)
, 0
}
, (10)
then the low-cost firm drives the high-cost firm out of the market by increasing the consumer’s
threshold level by advertisments (δx =
m
2cy
+ cy
4a
− k) and setting a price cy.
Proof. Since firm x can make profits by (8), maximizing Πx (δx) gives us the required
fist-stage action of firm x. Then by 2ma ≥ c2y we have to maximize Πx above intervals[
−k, cy
2a
− k
]
,
[
cy
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
]
,
[
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
]
.32 From cy
2a
− k ≤ 0 ≤ m
2cy
+ cy
4a
− k it
follows that Πivx achieves its maximum at
cy
2a
−k within
[
−k, cy
2a
− k
]
, Πix atmax
{
− cx
2a
, cy
2a
− k
}
within
[
cy
2a
− k, m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
]
and Πiix at
m
2cy
+ cy
4a
−k within
[
m
2cy
− k + cy
4a
,∞
]
; which completes
the proof by considering Πx (δx), δ
∗
y (δx) and Πy (δy).
32Πv
x
(δx) is negative in region (v).
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B Content Descriptions
B.1 Direct Product Information
B.1.1 Price
This category is triggered if the price is either stated or conspicuously visible. It is not
triggered, however, if the price is not stated and only visible in small print (inconspicuous).
B.1.2 Features
By definition, a feature is simply a product characteristic. It can be stated, shown, or written
on the screen. A product feature is something easily observed or demonstrated visually or
through verbal description. It can be stated by a narrator or character, shown, or provided in
writing. For food, product features may include ingredients. This category is also triggered
by close-up views of the product and explanations of new features added to existing products.
B.1.3 Verifiable quality claims
A quality claim refers to product durability, how quickly it begins to work (consider household
products), how long it will last, how much one can save in monetary terms by using the
product, or any other attribute of the product’s quality. It is a verifiable claim if it can be
directly verified by the consumer or by a third party (not the producer). It is possible that
the claim is unstated but implied through imagery or sequences of images.
B.2 Situational Associations - Thresholds
B.2.1 Health
The health threshold refers to a situation where the product induces a positive change in
the subjective well-being of a character. This category is triggered when at least seeing or
hearing about the product induces a change in facial expression, a change in physical activity,
or a marked change in health.
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B.2.2 Survival
Advertisements may imply that those who don’t use the product suffer a negative effect. This
category is triggered when a character (or implied character) who doesn’t use the product
suffers death (or an implied death).
B.2.3 Courtship
The strong form of romance includes situations where a male (female) is wooing a female
(male) (could already be a couple), there is a display of affection (hugging, kissing, touching),
hearts are shown, flirting is evident, etc. A positive response would be triggered if any of
the above situations occur in a positive setting. A negative response would be triggered if it
is apparent that either the male or female has at least romantic interest towards the other
but the other behaves in a negative manner towards the one that has this romantic interest.
For example, a man may give a woman an item of jewelry (advertised product) and she
hugs him in return. This would trigger a positive response. On the other hand, a man may
give a woman an item of jewelry (competitor’s product) and she rejects the gift and walks
away. This would trigger a negative reponse. In either case, the strong form suggests that
the average viewer could discern that the male and/or female had romantic interest towards
each other. In advertisements during children’s programming, any explicit form of romance,
i.e., hearts, display of affection, will trigger this category.
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